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Open source is often presented as a very promising governance structure for the 
development of software in the Internet world. One of its greatest advantages is 
that it enables and integrates the flow of innovation coming from many unrelated 
developers. We extend previous inquiries by showing that, due to information 
communication problems, this governance structure is in fact more efficient for the 
development of incremental innovations rather than radical innovations. 
Implications are drawn in terms of the future of the open source system, the 
economics of innovation and public policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Open source software has recently been the object of considerable attention 
from the press, policy-makers and researchers (Blind & Edler, 2003). Crudely 
defined, open source software is software developed through an Internet 
community of volunteer developers, in which the source code – meaning the 
higher-level programming instructions that tell a computer what to perform – 
is made available to everyone. As such, the source code is non-proprietary 
and can be freely used, copied or distributed with or without modifications 
(Stallman, 1999). This system stands at odds with the one used by software 
companies since the 1970s, which have generally been choosing to withhold 
source codes to protect their proprietary software and reap commercial profits 
related to their innovations (Burgelman & Meza, 2001)..  
Open source software – especially using popular examples such as the 
operating system Linux or the Apache Web server – has been the subject of 
several investigations in the economics and management literature 
(Krishnamurthy, 2003; Lerner & Tirole, 2001). A key driver of these 
investigations has been to understand why volunteer developers would decide 
to work for free to create public goods, something that has been seen by some 
as a challenge to standard economic principles, particularly regarding the 
relationships between individual incentives and innovation (Dalle & Jullien, 
2003). As a response to this challenge, existing literature stresses the role of 
short-term benefits in terms of using the software, since these developers are   5
often professional programmers trying to fix bugs and adapt the software to 
their own needs (Johnson, 2002; von Hippel, 2001; von Hippel & Krogh, 
2003). Other work focuses on delayed benefits related to the fact that 
developers’ contributions to the most successful innovations are well 
identified and therefore create positive spill-over in terms of peer recognition 
and future career opportunities (Kollock 1999; Lerner & Tirole, 2002). Case 
studies confirm that these delayed benefits play a very important role in the 
open source community (Hertel, Niedner & Herrmann, 2003). 
Evidence, however, suggests that a puzzle remains: if open source 
developers are mainly driven by these delayed benefits, one would expect 
outside developers to take risks and concentrate their efforts on real 
technological breakthroughs, i.e., software innovation with the potential to 
change the way people are doing things and therefore the likelihood of 
generating peer recognition and future career opportunities. In the rest of the 
document and following well-established literature in the economics of 
innovation, we will use the term “radical innovation” to characterize those 
breakthroughs, whereas more mundane market innovation will be called 
incremental (Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Damanpour, 1991; Henderson & 
Clark, 1990).  The radical or incremental adjectives are not used in a market 
based definition where only the market would qualify ex post an innovation 
as radical or incremental (see the well-known example of Sony’s Betacam). 
Here, we consider an ex ante definition that relies on the technological aspect   6
of the product, voluntarily putting aside some potential network economies 
that could undermine this definition. 
However, empirical evidence shows that in fact the opposite is true: 
open source projects, even the most successful ones such as Linux, tend to be 
incremental innovations compared to that which was already available for 
users. It cannot be denied that open source software is generating 
innovations and that some of these innovations are creating value and 
developing market shares, but a significant number of them remain 
incremental innovations rather than radical ones. Why is that?  What is the 
incentive mechanism one needs in order to develop a radical innovation? 
The purpose of this paper is to explore this puzzle. We suggest that one 
idiosyncratic aspect of open source software development has been neglected 
by existing literature: the way information is exchanged between the project 
leader, i.e., the one at the origin of the innovation, and the developers. 
Because information is exchanged exclusively through e-mail messaging, 
actors function in an almost perfect information environment, in which it is 
difficult to determine who will make a strong commitment to develop the 
innovation. Hence, radical innovations are more difficult to plan and require 
a higher level of commitment by developers than would incremental 
innovation.  The paper focuses only on the locus of innovation and type of 
innovation concomitantly with the possible coordination problem.   7
The first section of the paper explores the boundaries of open source as 
a governance structure. The second presents the model’s basic set up. Section 
3 then introduces communication problems, examines the open source 
development of an innovation in a situation of incomplete information and 
derives sequential equilibria. The last section concludes and discusses the 
implications of our results for the future development of open source as a 
governance structure for software innovation, as well as for public policy 
purposes.  
 
OPEN SOURCE AS A GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
Our starting point in this paper is to consider open source as a governance 
structure (Garzarelli, 2002; Williamson, 1985) with specific characteristics 
different from those of software companies (McCormack et al., 2001). Here, 
we underline the main aspects of this governance structure. The development 
process in an open source environment generally works in the following way: 
a project leader designs the first program, writes the basic lines of codes and 
makes them available to other developers (Raymond, 1999). The role of this 
leader is key to the open source system, as this is the first innovation attempt 
by the project leader.  This initial attempt either attracts or does not attract 
further developers and triggers the software development process. The rest of 
the process relies on outside developers working on debugging and creating 
patches to improve the quality of the program, as well as writing new lines of 
code to add new features and applications (Kollock, 1999). In most cases, it is   8
also the leader who decides whether to include the debugs and patches 
proposed by the other developers or to discard them.  
Outside developers who participate as volunteers in the project 
development are therefore the key factor in the open source system. As 
suggested earlier, existing economics literature has gone a long way in 
explaining why those developers might offer their services free of charge 
(Lerner & Tirole, 2002). Equally important, however, is the question of which 
projects outside developers will decide to participate in and how they will 
allocate their time and efforts among these projects. In effect, as noted by 
Raymond (1999), the pool of capable developers is limited, implying that, as 
the open source movement continues to develop, developers carefully consider 
various projects and make different levels of commitment to these projects. 
They can commit most of their time and effort to a project that they find 
particularly interesting and useful, or they can make only a weak 
commitment to many projects, thus making small contributions to numerous 
new versions of open source software. There seems to be a wide range of 
developers’ behaviors regarding this strategy. Hertel et al. (2003), for 
instance, show that developers spend more time on Linux development when 
they feel that their contribution is highly important to the software itself.  
A developer’s decision whether or not to participate may also depend 
on the level of commitment made by others. In effect, before deciding to make 
a strong commitment to a very innovative project, a developer will probably   9
need to know whether others are ready to make the same kind of 
commitment. If they are not, then a very innovative project - one that is likely 
to demand the greatest amount of time, effort and creativity - will not hold its 
promises. Note that existing literature has stressed the role of an installed 
base of developers and has studied its effects on the probability of an open 
source project reaching completion (Johnson, 2002), therefore considering a 
network externality. Here, we concentrate on another type of externality, 
which is not based on the crude number of other developers, but rather on the 
level of commitment a developer perceives among others interested in the 
project.   
Note also that this “commitment externality” affects not only potential 
developers, but also the project leader himself. Even though he might be 
convinced that his project has the potential to become a radical innovation, 
he might decide to invest only some of his time and effort into it because he 
knows he will need the support of other strongly committed developers to 
make it work. To some extent, one can even argue that a project leader tries 
to gauge the interest in a potential innovation by launching it on the 
Internet.  
In many respects, the project leader plays a key role. While the leader’s 
reputation may encourage people to commit to the project, along with the 
incentive discussions in the literature, there is another benefit of this 
leadership: the centralization of information. This centralization helps reduce   10
the asymmetries of information due to the horizontal organization of an open-
source project compared to the vertical organization of a proprietary 
development. Indeed, an open source development relies on a network of 
developers around the world, rather than being centralized in one or just a 
few places, as is the case with the proprietary software industry. 
Asymmetries of information are present in vertical organization as 
well as horizontal. But the degree of centralization of a vertical organization 
reduces these asymmetries. For the horizontal organization, asymmetries of 
information can be reduced in many ways. First, from a non-exhaustive list, 
the object-oriented nature of software reduces the asymmetries of 
information by clustering and focalizing developers on some specific pieces of 
software. Second, the use of collaborative tools – one being developed by open 
source developers is eGroupWare – introduces a degree of centralization 
almost equivalent to a proprietary software development firm. Although 
these two conditions are necessary, they are not sufficient to trigger a radical 
innovation. The third condition is important: the leadership. Indeed, the 
leader will impose the goals, the future developments, and, more importantly, 
the agenda. On this latter point, it is interesting to note that the website 
Sourceforge.net created an index and a ranking based on this index to 
measure the activeness of open source projects. 
How then can the project leader and developers evaluate the level of 
commitment that others are ready to make? The answer is that, in an open   11
source community, they do this almost exclusively through e-mail 
messaging1. This process deserves attention. In effect, the open source model 
relies on modes of communication that are not as “information-rich” as 
others, such as face-to-face meetings: risks of miscommunication or 
misunderstanding are therefore potentially greater. In the next section, we 
create a model of open source software development that takes this 




We represent a two-player game,  1, 2 i = . One player is the project leader and 
the other is the outside developer. The project leader would like the developer 
to take part in his project, while the developer must choose whether to make 
a strong or a weak commitment to the project.   
At the beginning of each game, players make their decision based on 
what they know about the state of nature:  , NA B = .  A   corresponds to a 
                                                 
1 The relationships between the open source movement and the Internet are indeed very close. Some argue 
that it is the widespread use of the Internet that has caused the recent explosion of interest in this 20-year-
old open source model. The Internet has allowed the open source movement to prosper because it has 
considerably lowered communication and collaboration costs for potential users and developers. The open 
source movement has existed at least since Richard Stallman's 1984 effort to develop the GNU software 
(Stallman, R. (1999). The GNU Operating System and the Free Software Movement. Open Sources: Voices 
of Open Source Revolution. C. Di Bona, S. Ockman and M. Stone. Sebastopol, O'Reilly and Associates.). 
However, only the rise of the Internet enabled the diffusion of open source efforts.   12
situation in which the open source software project is an incremental 
innovation, i.e., a minor improvement of a program that already exists. B  
corresponds to a situation in which the new software has the potential to 
become a radical innovation. This dichotomy might raise questions in the 
context of software. Software, in effect, is generally developed through an 
incremental process. So what constitutes a radical innovation in software? 
We consider here that a radical innovation is a project for which there is no 
pre-existing template software architecture (von Krogh et al., 2003). The 
architecture of a software characterizes the functionality of specific modules 
within the software and the interdependencies and interactions among these. 
In the case of a radical software innovation, therefore, the development 
process itself is a total discovery for developers.  
In the game, it is assumed that the leader and the developer have 
similar pay-offs and cost structures. The leader has discovered an innovation 
and would like other developers to participate. But he must also determine 
whether or not to invest a lot of time and effort in the project, as must the 
developer. This decision will be based upon how one developer perceives the 
other developer’s level of commitment. Both players wish to maximize their 
profits. Following Lerner & Tirole (2001), we assume that these profits are 
mainly delayed benefits, i.e., ways of creating strong signals about talents 
and innovativeness. Similarly, costs are primarily the opportunity costs of the   13
time and effort the developer spends contributing to the open source project. 
The objective functions can be represented by: 
  ()m a x() ii ON C = Π  (1) 
where  i C  represents the total cost of developer i in the state of nature A or 
B .  
 
STRATEGIES 
The leader and the developer each have two options: weak commitment (m ) 
or strong commitment (M ) to the project. Weak commitment means that the 
developer plans to address some issues but will also continue to work on 
many other projects in parallel. On the other hand, strong commitment 
means that the software developer plans to devote most or all his time and 
effort to the project. The total cost function is: 
 















By assumption, we consider that:  
•  In state of nature A, both the leader and the developer are better off 
by making only a weak commitment to the project. The innovation is 
only incremental and is likely to be modularized, meaning that lots of 
other developers might be working on the project at the same time, all 
making incremental additions. Making a strong commitment to such a   14
project would probably be a waste of time and effort, since delayed 
benefits would not be high enough to justify that investment.  
•  In state of nature B , it would be rational for the two players to make a 
strong commitment to the development of the radical innovation. The 
opportunity cost is lower, and therefore we can write  () ()
MM
ii CBCA < .  
Considering a Bertrand competition without capacity constraint, 2  the 
optimal-Pareto solution is thus: 
  () () ( ) () { } 12 1 2 ,; ,
mm MM OO A OO B (3) 
In such a configuration, payments are  ( ) ( )
mM
ii OAOA >  and  () ( )
Mm
ii OBOB > , 
and they prevent the prisoner’s dilemma, as represented in Figure 1.  
 
                                                 
2 It is one of the characteristics of the software industry.   15
 
Figure 1. Decision tree. 
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COMMUNICATION IN THE CONTEXT OF AN OPEN SOURCE 
INNOVATION 
In reality, the co-ordination mechanism of the commitment strategies of the 
two players in the open source project may be imperfect, as neither of the 
players can directly observe or monitor what the other does. Players 
communicate only through e-mails. Methods of communication between open 
source developers create, in the context of innovation, a situation of ‘almost 
perfect information’ (Rubinstein, 1989). Building on Rubinstein’s approach, 
we model the interaction between the leader trying to attract developers and 
a developer.  This interaction takes place within a context of incomplete 




In order to represent this “noise” in the co-ordination mechanism, we assume 
that the project leader has private information on the state of nature. In 
other words, he has a clear idea of the potential of the innovation. The project 
leader, then, freely passes this information to the other player, the potential 
developer. If the innovation is incremental, the leader simply posts the code 
on the Internet and does not send additional messages. On the other hand, if 
the innovation is radical, he also sends messages to advertise his innovation 
and encourage the outside developer to rally to it.    17
This transmission corresponds to the modeling of co-ordination. Each 
player must consider his or her own information, but also the information of 
the other player. Therefore, even when both players are certain of the 
project’s innovation potential (either incremental or radical), if one actor is 
not sure how committed the other is to the project, that player can behave in 
ways that are contradictory to behaviors that would have been chosen based 
on this certainty.3  
To begin the analysis, we assume that the most probable event is state 
of nature A, i.e., that the project is an incremental innovation. If B  occurs, a 
message is sent from the leader to the developer claiming that his new 
project might become a radical innovation. The developer receives the 
message, understands that the project has the potential to be a radical 
innovation, and therefore sends a message back to the leader expressing 
interest. The project leader then responds with another confirmation of his 
expectations and commitment to the project, etc. This entire exchange is 
made necessary by potential failures of the transmission system: the 
information contained in the message sent by one of the players has a small 
probability of being lost or misunderstood by the other player,  0 q > . In 
principle, this probability is small because hackers speak a common language 
and are all trained to program on Unix. The probability that a message still 
                                                 
3 Here, both developers are volunteers and do not hide information strategically. We can introduce the idea 
of firms voluntarily willing to hide this information, but this is not something we consider in this paper.   18
circulates beyond a very large number of exchanges is thus a priori weak, but 
still exists and is not insignificant. Von Grogh et al. (2003) report, for 
instance, that in the case of the development of the open source project 
Freenet, the average number of e-mails needed before a joiner became a 
developer was 23.4.  
Assume that, at some point, the communication ceases when the 
leader has sent a final message. This project leader in fact ends up in a 
situation of partial uncertainty: he knows the developer has expressed 
interest and even willingness to make a strong commitment to the 
development of the radical innovation. However, the project leader, not 
having received an e-mail from the developer, is left wondering whether the 
developer is still convinced that he, the project leader, is in fact strongly 
committed to the project. In other words, has the developer already started 
working hard on developing the radical innovation, in which case her last e-
mail might have been lost? Or has she not responded because she did not 
receive the previous message from the project leader and therefore doubts 
that he is still committed to the development of the innovation?  
 
SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIA 
We consider the probability, q , that a message sent by one of the 
players may be lost or misunderstood. The game has an infinite horizon 
because of the back-and-forth transmission of messages. The procedure of   19
sending messages does not form part of the strategy: the real game (the open 
source software development itself) begins only when no further messages are 
exchanged between the two players, i.e., when both players have decided on 
the level of commitment they wish to make to the project.  
Formally, we use the following notations to depict this situation:  
•  0 C , the beginning of the game ; the project leader discovers that the 
state of nature is either A  or  B   with the probability distribution 
() ,1 p p −  and  1/2 p > ;  
•  t C , the tth message (sent by the project leader if T  is odd and by the 
outside developer if T  is even);  
•  t I , following sets of information: 
o  A I , the project leader discovered that the state of nature is A 
and sent no additional message to the developer, 
o  0 I , the developer did not receive any message, 
o  1 I , the project leader discovered that the state of nature is B  
and sent  1 C  to the developer, 
o  2 I , the developer received  1 C , understood that the innovation 
had the potential to be a radical one and therefore sent  2 C  to 
express willingness to make a commitment to its development;   20
o  and more generally:  2t I , corresponds to the state of information 
of the developer when he sent  2t C , while  21 t I +   is the project 
leader’s information set.  
 
Figure 2. Developed form. 
 
The fact that q>0 is not a trivial assumption.  The interesting feature 
of this assumption and of the model that follows is that even when the 
organizational issues seem to be fixed by the technology, or the clustering of 
the whole projects in smaller projects (objects) – in other words, when the 
uncertainty seems to be resolved – the outcome may still be Pareto ineffective   21
due to the lack of leadership. For an even greater strength of the model, we 
put ourselves in a situation where a radical innovation is more likely than an 
incremental one: p>1/2. 
Indeed, as soon as the developer receives a message regarding the new 
open source project, she knows that the state of nature is B . Thus, except  A I  
and  0 I , the uncertainty is no longer due to the initial event, which is now 
known to both players, but rather to the state of information of the other 
player. For example, in  2 I , the developer replied to the first message with  2 C , 
and, as she did not receive any further messages, she does not know if the 
project leader is in  1 I  (the project leader sent the first message  1 C  but did not 
receive C2) or in  3 I  (the project leader received  2 C but did not send anything 
after that).  
More generally, if the player’s state of information is  t I , she does not 
know whether the other is informed of  1 t I − or  1 t I + . However, the probability of 
these two events taking place is not equal. In fact, we can show that, if a 
player sent a message  t C  and did not receive a confirmation, there is more 
chance that  t C  was lost rather than  1 t C +  confirmation did not arrive. 
 
LEMMA 1. If a player sent a message  t C  and did not receive a response from 
the other player, it is more likely that  t C  was lost rather than that  1 t C +  did not 
arrive.    22
 
Proof. We calculate the conditional probabilities of  1 t I −  and  1 t I +  knowing  t I  for 
any  1 t ≥ : 









































Knowing  t I , a player knows that the other player is more likely to be in 1 t I −  
than in  1 t I + .  □ 
 
The implication of Lemma 1 is that, when a player does not receive a 
message in which the other player confirms his strong commitment, the 
former thinks that the latter is in fact more likely to make a weak 
commitment rather than a strong one. If the developer did not receive a 
message, she thinks that it is more likely that the project leader plays as if 
the state of nature was  A.  
 
LEMMA 2. The property of conditional optimality of a sequential equilibrium 
implies here that, whatever  0 q >   and whatever the number of exchanged 
messages, co-ordination between the project leader and the developer cannot be 
applied with certainty.    23
 
Proof. As  1/2 p > , we have: 








In other words, if the outside developer did not receive any messages, he or 
she thinks that it is more likely that the state of nature is A, rather than 
that the first message was lost.  □ 
 
To obtain perfect co-ordination, the project leader must thus play m  if 
A . As a consequence, the developer will also make a weak commitment 
within the context of an incremental innovation. The following proposition 
makes that clear.  
 
PROPOSITION 1: When the state of nature is A, the property of conditional 
optimality implies that the developer plays m.  
 
Proof. Let us determine a sequential equilibrium in which the project leader 
plays m  if  A. In this case:  
 
In  0 I , the developer minimizes its loss expectation, knowing that it will 
obtain: 
  ()( ) () ( ) ()
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As  () () 01 0 A PI I PII >  and  ( ) ( ) 22
mM OAOA > , the property of conditional 
optimality implies that the outside developer plays m .     □  
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Similarly, even if the project has the potential to become a radical 
innovation, players will also make a weak commitment, leading to a 
suboptimal result. 
 
PROPOSITION 2: When the state of nature is B, the property of conditional 
optimality implies that both the project leader and the developer play m, even 
though the development of the innovation would require M.  
 
Proof. In  1 I , the project leader knows B  and knows that the developer plays 
m  in  0 I . Its expectations of conditional losses are then respectively: 
  () ( ) () ( ) ()
() () () () ()
01 1 21 1
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As  ()() 01 21 PI I PI I > and  ( ) ( ) 11
mM OB m OB m > , the property of conditional 
optimality implies again that the project leader chooses m .  
 
By recurrence, the two players always choose m .     □  
 
This equilibrium is the fear of any leader, either in the proprietary 
software industry or the open source industry. If one wishes to extend the 
range of this conclusion, due to the differences in management in these two 
worlds, the open source development may be assumed to be less effective – or 
slower – at fixing issues due to asymmetries of information. If this holds true, 
and although the state of nature may be a radical innovation, open source 
developers in projects with a low commitment could a sub-optimal 
equilibrium. 
   25
CONCLUSION - DISCUSSION 
 The model developed here explores the choices made by leaders and 
outside developers in the context of an open source innovation (Blind & Edler, 
2003). It shows that, having taken into account the uncertainty created by e-
mail communication among developers, an open source governance structure 
creates incentives to under-invest in software that constitutes radical 
innovations. This provides an explanation for the puzzle underlined in the 
introduction of this paper: the most successful open source softwares tend to 
be incremental innovations, even though developers might gain greater 
benefits to their reputation by investing in radical ones. Our paper also 
explains a related empirical phenomenon, observed in several case studies of 
open source projects (von Krogh et al., 2003; Lerner and Tirole, 2002): open 
source developers tend to participate in many projects instead of focusing 
their efforts on the one they think is the most innovative (Burgelman & 
Meza, 2001)..  
This paper therefore contributes to the existing literature on the 
economics of open source projects and software development, especially 
regarding what makes this open source governance structure more or less 
efficient depending on the situation. Short-term benefits of developers also 
being users (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003), and delayed benefits in terms of 
reputation (Lerner & Tirole, 2002) have been identified by previous literature 
as being key criteria explaining how an open source governance structure   26
works and might be efficient in certain situations. Here we add another key 
criterion: the nature of the innovation, either radical or incremental.  
Because of the coordination problems highlighted in the model, it is 
very difficult for a developer to know for sure that the project leader or other 
developers are ready to make a strong commitment to the development of the 
innovation. Note that firms generally do not face this kind of signaling 
problem. Firms, for example through expansive advertising or celebrity 
endorsements, can send a strong and credible signal to consumers, to 
suppliers or other corporate allies that they plan to make a strong 
commitment. As shown in this paper, this type of signal is much more 
difficult to create for open source developers. How an open source governance 
structure might, in certain cases, be able to overcome this problem is an 
interesting topic for future research.  
Following our insights here, one can represent the relative efficiency of 
different governance structures by looking at two key dimensions (Table 1). 
On a vertical axis, one can consider the number of potential users of the 
innovation among the community of developers. This dimension takes into 
account the short-term benefits extracted by users of the software, as 
identified by von Hippel (2001). The horizontal dimension takes into account 
the nature of the innovation, either incremental or radical, as considered in 
this paper. As highlighted by the two grey areas in Table 1, our paper, 
combined with the existing literature, suggests that the open source model is   27
probably the most efficient governance structure when there are many 
potential users in the community of developers and the innovation is 
incremental. On the other hand, a closed source governance structure might 
be more efficient if the innovation is radical and there are few potential users 
among developers. In this case, the co-ordination problems stressed by our 
model should be quite difficult to overcome, making a corporate actor more 
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structure: Closed source 
and then open source, 
but with the firm 
staying highly involved 
 
 
Closed source  
– a firm 
 
Table 1: Efficient governance structures for software 
innovations  
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Our discussion here also points out a clear avenue for future research. 
In effect, two areas remain to be studied in depth: when the innovation is 
radical with many potential users-developers, and when the innovation is 
incremental with few potential users among developers. For these cases, we 
indicated in Table 1 that mixed governance structures might be efficient 
options. By mixed governance structures –also been called hybrid strategies 
(West, 2003)– we mean that the innovation would begin as a closed source 
initiative and would move later to an open source one. Many companies have 
already engaged in these kinds of mixed governance structures, the most 
famous ones being Netscape with Mozilla (Hamerly et al., 1999), Hewlett-
Packard with e-speaking software, or even IBM with its WebSphere suite 
which includes Apache.  
One interesting aspect here is that the involvement of firms in some 
sort of open source project can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the 
firm can help create stronger delayed incentives for developers, in terms of 
future career benefits, recognition or press coverage of the innovation. These 
might be important supports when the innovation is incremental but there 
are few potential users. By removing delayed benefits, more developers might 
become interested in a project, even though they are not direct users. In this 
case, the firm might keep a degree of control over the development of the 
software, for instance by sitting on some sort of open source governing council 
which monitors the process.   29
On the other hand, however, firm involvement may also create some 
disincentives for certain developers to participate. Microsoft’s attempts to 
participate in open source development, for instance, have not generated   
great support from developers (see for instance Tieman, 2001). In cases where 
there are many potential users among developers but the innovation is 
radical, this is probably a point to consider. A firm can certainly help start 
the process, but its continued control, for instance through a governing 
council, might create disincentives for developers. Releasing the product 
freely and fully into an open source model might be a good option in this case. 
These are just speculations based on the model proposed in this paper. 
Research in the future should certainly clarify whether these directions truly 
matter for the determination of mixed governance structures in software 
development.  
 
Our results also speak to the literature on the economics and 
management of innovation as a whole. Starting with Schumpeter (1950) and 
Arrow (1962), this literature has focused on whether incumbents or new 
entrants were more likely to innovate. Further studies have shown that this 
depends on the nature of the innovation. In effect, an innovation can be 
incremental (or radical) either in the economic sense (which is the one that 
has been considered in this paper), or in the organizational sense (Henderson 
& Clark, 1990; Henderson, 1993). Compared to proprietary software, open   30
source projects are clear radical innovations in the organizational sense (von 
Krogh et al., 2003). However, we suggested here that they are unlikely to 
deliver radical innovations in the economic sense.  Regarding the question of 
who is more likely to innovate, we might therefore reconsider Henderson & 
Clark’s matrix as shown in Table 2. In that context, open source projects 
would be more likely to generate innovations that are incremental in the 
economic sense, but which are based on a brand new organizational 
structure. The open source system certainly has the flexibility to generate 
those organizational innovations. On the other hand, proprietary incumbents 
would remain more likely to innovate when the innovation is incremental 
both in the economic and organizational sense, due to their existing 
capabilities and their redeployment. Finally, proprietary new entrants would 
be the most likely to propose innovations that are both radical in the 
economic and the organizational sense. In this latter case, the coordination 
problems highlighted in this paper might make the open source governance 
structure less efficient.  
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  Incremental –  
Economic 
 








more likely to innovate 
Unclear 
 




Open source projects 
more likely to innovate 
Proprietary new 
entrants more likely to 
innovate 
 
Table 2: Who is most likely to innovate in the software industry? 
 
This analysis has deep implications for competitive dynamics in the 
software industry. It suggests that open source projects are in fact more 
likely to compete head to head with incumbents rather than with new 
entrants, both mainly targeting incremental innovations in the economic 
sense. The public policy debate concerning copyrights, in which open source 
proponents argue fiercely against software companies, takes on a new 
dimension from this angle.   
 
Our analysis also has implications for public policy. Open source 
proponents are at the origin of a large controversy, especially in the 
European Union, regarding software copyrights. This paper does not take 
sides in this debate, but it does add another perspective: that open source 
governance structure is not necessarily the best way to develop software - it 
depends on the innovation. For radical innovations, there are some incentives   32
for innovators to go for a more integrated and hierarchical structure, at least 
in the beginning. That is not to say that there should be copyrights to protect 
software innovations, but rather that it would be inefficient to necessarily 
look for a decentralized governance structure.  
By the same token, our paper also has implications for antitrust. A lot 
has been written on the Microsoft trial, and much of what has been written 
suggests that the very existence of Microsoft impeded the natural evolution of 
the open source mode of development. Our model suggests that, even in a 
world where no outside barriers to the development of the open source mode 
exist, there might still be some reasons why, for certain specific innovations, 
a more integrated mode might be superior. It might even be that the more 
innovative the project, the greater the incentive for the project leader to 
choose the closed source model. This would not be related to willingness by 
this project leader to benefit from monopoly rents, but would be the most 
efficient way to cope with the great uncertainty highlighted in this paper. 
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